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COMMENT
North Carolina's New Mental Health Laws: More Due Process
[I]t is a basic guarantee of our constitution that no individual
should be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
Certainly the loss of freedom, of property, and of civil and per-
sonal rights solely because of mental illness is a process which
should disturb every American concerned with the blessings of
liberty. It is tempting to say that the problems of the mentally ill
and their families are of no concern to the rest of the population.
But the impact of laws on mental illness is greater in scope
than most people realize. Nine years ago, in conducting the first
comprehensive congressional study of the rights of this group of
citizens, the subcommittee was told that one out of every 12 chil-
dren born would at one time or another be subject to treatment in
a mental institution, and an even larger percentage of our popula-
tion would be subject to some form of mental care.
Mental illness, and the laws governing it, are the concern of
all of us. The truth of the matter is that when we tolerate arbi-
trary acts, vague standards, administrative and legislative lethargy
which deprives others of their right to health and to effective exer-
cise of their freedom, then we tolerate a breakdown in our consti-
tutional form of government.'
-Senator Sant Ervin
Based on the present rate of hospitalization, one out of every ten
citizens will spend a portion of his life in a mental institution.2  As
indicated by Senator Ervin's statement, the laws that affect the rights
of the mentally ill are obviously of major significance to everyone.
However, the determination of when and to what extent the laws should
restrict or protect the rights of the mentally ill is one of the most trou-
blesome questions in the field of law today.'
In 1973, North Carolina legislators completely rewrote the sec-
tions of the North Carolina General Statutes dealing with the involun-
tary commitment and voluntary admission of the mentally ill and in-
1. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Hearings].
2. S. BRAxEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW xv (rev. ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as MENTALLY DISABLED].
3. Id.
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ebriate. This comment will examine the new mental health legislation,
why it was needed, and its constitutional implications and administra-
tive ramifications.
I. THE INCENTIVE TO CHANGE: IN RE HAYES4
In order to understand why the new laws were needed, it is neces-
sary to examine both the constitutional infirmity and the administra-
tive failure inherent under the old statutes. Under the previous statutes
a person could receive mental treatment through four different proce-
dures: voluntary admission, 5 admission by medical certification, 6 emer-
gency hospitalization,7 and judicial hospitalization.8 The last two pro-
cedures were recently declared unconstitutional on their face by the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in the case of In re Hayes.
In Hayes a seventeen year old girl was committed to a mental
hospital in North Carolina on April 14, 1969, pursuant to the emer-
gency hospital procedures set forth in section 122-59.10 This sec-
tion provided for the detention, by physical force if necessary, of any
person for a maximum of twenty days if, by reason of "overt acts,"
he was believed to be "suddenly violent and dangerous to himself or
others."" The affidavit upon which Miss Hayes was committed stated
4. 18 N.C. App. 560, 197 S.E.2d 582, appeal dismissed, 283 N.C. 753, 198 S.E.
2d 729 (1973).
5. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1647 (repealed
1973).
6. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1647-48 (re-
pealed 1973).
7. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1648-49 (re-
pealed 1973).
8. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1650-51 (re-
pealed 1973).
9. 18 N.C. App. at 562, 197 S.E.2d at 584.
10. Id. at 560, 197 S.E.2d at 582.
11. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1648-49 (re-
pealed 1973). The section provides authorization for such detention in one of two
ways. A qualified physician may submit an affidavit to the effect that he has exam-
ined the person within 24 hours of his affidavit and that he believes the person is
homicidal or suicidal or dangerou§ to himself or others. This affidavit then becomes
the police officer's authority to take a person into custody and transport the person
to a suitable place of detention. This was the method by which Miss Hayes was taken
into custody. If a person has not been examined by a physician but it is believed
that it would be too dangerous to take the person to a physician without restraint,
a second means of authorization is provided. The clerk of superior court may issue
an order to the sheriff to detain such a person based on "any person having knowledge
of the facts" who submits a written application signed and sworn to before the clerk
stating that he believes the person to be homicidal or suicidal and stating the grounds
which support this belief that it would be dangerous to attempt to examine the person
without restraint. Id.
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no overt acts upon which to base emergency hospitalization, nor did
it indicate whether Miss Hayes was homicidal, suicidal, or dangerous. 2
Fourteen days after her confinement a hearing for judicial com-
mitment was held at the hospital in accordance with section 122-63
which provided for an "informal" hearing by the clerk of superior court
after two qualified physicians had examined the person alleged to be
mentally ill. 3  Two doctors' affidavits were presented in accordance
with the statutory procedures.' 4 A member of the hospital staff gave
notice of the hearing to the girl at three o'clock in the afternoon, and
the hearing was held fifty minutes later.' 5 Miss Hayes was not ad-
vised by counsel at the hearing, nor was she given the opportunity to
cross-examine or confront the examining physicians since they were not
present.'0
Some of the evidence introduced to support the commitment in-
dicated that the girl had been leaving home for several days at a time
and having sexual intercourse with several members of the community.
This conduct had resulted in vaginal bleeding which endangered her
health.' 7  The girl had also been treated previously in a mental institu-
tion for approximately three years, but she did not use alcohol or drugs,
and she never had attempted or threatened suicide or homicide. The
clerk of court ruled at the hearing that the girl remain involuntarily
committed.' 8 At the end of the 180 day period, which was the maxi-
mum time a clerk could have committed a patient under section 122-
63, the right to a second informal hearing was "waived" by the girl,
12. Brief for Appellee at 3, In re Hayes, 18 N.C. App. 560, 197 S.E.2d 582,
appeal dismissed, 283 N.C. 753, 198 S.E.2d 729 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hayes
Brief].
13. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1650-51 (re-
pealed 1973) requires that the clerk hold an "informal" hearing "without unnecessary
delay" of which the alleged mentally ill person is notified. The clerk is required to
examine the affidavits of the examining physicians and any proper witnesses. At the
conclusion of the hearings, if the clerk finds the person is in need of observation or
treatment, he may order the person committed up to a maximum of 180 days. Id.
14. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1650 (repealed
1973). This section requires that when an affidavit and request for examination of
an alleged mentally ill person is made, the clerk shall direct two qualified physicians
who are not directly involved with the care and treatment of the patient in the hospital
to examine the person. If the physicians find that the person is a proper subject for
observation and treatment and should be hospitalized, they will sign an affidavit to
that effect. This procedure must be followed before the informal hearing is held in
section 122-63. Id.
15. 18 N.C. App. at 560, 197 S.E.2d at 583.
16. Hayes Brief 3.
17. 18 N.C. App. at 561, 197 S.E.2d at 583.
18. Id.
1974]
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and upon the recommendation of the superintendent of the hospital,
an indeterminate period of commitment provided by section 122-
6519 was imposed.20 The girl remained in the hospital almost three
years before she was released by writ of habeas corpus.
The trial judge who ordered Miss Haye's release held section 122-
50 (the emergency hospitalization section), section 122-63 (the sec-
tion in the judicial hospitalization proceeding that gave the clerk power
to commit a person after an informal hearing), and section 122-65 (the
section that allowed the clerk to order commitment for -an indeterminate
period at the end of the first 180 days of confinement) unconstitu-
tional on their face.2' The judge found that since these sections did
not require adequate notice, counsel, witnesses, and a hearing before
a judicial officer at all stages of the proceedings, the procedures resulted
in deprivation of liberty in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.22
The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision but did
not reveal the reasoning behind its decision, nor did it cite any cases
supporting its holding. s The court merely stated that although it did
not fully agree with the trial judge's reasoning, his ultimate conclusion
was correct.24 The court did comment on the new involuntary com-
mitment legislation that had repealed the three statutes in question and
rewritten Chapter 122, but it did not indicate whether this fact affected
its decision.25 Although the court of appeals failed to cite any cases,
its decision was probably based on the United States Supreme Court
decision in In re Gault20 and other recent cases27 which were persuasively
argued in the Hayes brief.2 8
19. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1651-52 (re-
pealed 1973) provides that at the end of the 180 day maximum period of confinement
which may be imposed under section 122-63, if the superintendent of the hospital feels
the patient needs further treatment, another hearing will be held (although it may be
waived by the patient) and if the .clerk agrees with the superintendent, an indeterminate
period of commitment ("for a minimum necessary period") may be ordered.
20. 18 N.C. App. at 561, 197 S.E.2d at 583.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 561-62, 197 S.E.2d at 583.
23. Id. at 562, 197 S.E.2d at 584.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. E.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Denton v. Common-
wealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
28. An in depth analysis of all the constitutional arguments made to the court
upon which it may have based its decision is beyond the scope of this comment; how-
ever, the main arguments will be examined briefly. For a detailed analysis, see Tiggs
[Vol. 52592
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, Although the'Gault case only dealt with the due process rights
required in juvenile commitment proceedings, a persuasive analogy
may be drawn between juvenile and mental commitments.2 9 In Gault,
the Court expressly rejected the argument that juvenile proceedings
are "civil" and therefore not subject to criminal procedural safeguards,
reasoning that "commitment is a deprivation of liberty . . . [and] in-
carceration against one's will whether it is called 'criminal' or 'ci-
vil."'30 This argument should also be rejected as applied to mental
commitment proceedings in North Carolina."1 As the Court's holding
indicates, what a proceeding is labeled should not be allowed to camou-
flage what is done in that proceeding. 2 Other Supreme 'Court deci-
sions support this view as it applies to mental commitments. 33
Two lower court decisions strongly challenge the civil-criminal
distinction and support the application of criminal procedural safeguards
to mental commitment proceedings. In Heryford v. Parker," the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated:
We do not have the distinction between the procedures used
to commit juveniles and adults as in Gault. But, like Gault, and
of utmost importance, we have a situation in which the liberty of
an individual is at stake, and we think the reasoning in Gault em-
phatically applies. It matters not whether the proceedings be la-
beled "civil" or "criminal" or whether the subject matter be mental
instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involun-
tary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a
crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment
and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which
commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due
process.35
& Hassell, Civil Commitment in North Carolina: Dispelling the Illusion of Due Proc-
ess, 10 WAKE FoaRsr L. REV. - (1974).
29. Hayes Brief 11.
30. 387 U.S. at 50; Hayes Brief 11.
31. Hayes Brief 15.
32. See 387 U.S. at 27; Hayes Brief 15.
33. In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), a case in which the petitioner
was sentenced to an indeterminate mental commitment under the Colorado Sex Offend-
ers Act, the Court stated:
These commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are
subject both to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
we held in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 and the Due Process Clause.
We hold that the requirements of due process were not satisfied here.
Id. at 608. Baxstrom involved a commitment to a mental hospital for criminals at
the expiration of a criminal senteikce. Reading Gault, Specht and Baxstrom together
may well indicate that the application of criminal procedural safeguards may be re-
quired whenever deprivation of liberty is possible. Hayes Brief 15.
34. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
35. Id. at 396.
1974]-
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In Denton v. Commonwealth80 the court explicitly rejected the civil-
criminal distinction:
Although lunacy inquests are not concerned with criminal in-
tent or criminal acts they may result in depriving the defendant of
his liberty and his property. This deprival should be obtained
only by the due processes of law under constitutional guarantees.
We have therefore concluded that when a proceeding may
lead to the loss of personal liberty, the defendant in that proceed-
ing should be afforded the same constitutional protection as is
given to the accused in a criminal prosecution.37
Another justification often asserted for limiting procedural safe-
guards for involuntary commitments is based on the argument that
mental patients constitute a special class of people who are subject to
the full parens patriae power of the state.3 8  This state-asserted right
to help and protect those who cannot (or will not) protect themselves
does not justify a limitation on procedural rights when a person's lib-
erty is at stake.39 In Gault the Court essentially rejected the parens
patriae argument as it applied to juvenile delinquents and in so doing
brought into question any state procedure justified on such grounds
which results in a deprivation of a person's liberty.40
The Gault Court held that due process required adequate and
meaningful notice of charges, 41 right to counsel, 42 the rights of con-
frontation and cross-examination, 43 and the privilege against self-in-
crimination.44  An examination of the specific statutes involved in
Hayes reveals the constitutional infirmity of each.
Section 122-63, which formed the basic "judicial commitment"
law under the old statute, provided that upon the filing of an affidavit
36. 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
37. Id. at 682.
38. Hayes Brief 16.
39. See id. 16-18.
40. See 387 U.S. at 15-20. The court in Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th
Cir. 1968), specifically rejected the parens patriae argument:
Where, as in both proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons,
the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to
vouchsafe due process, and this necessarily includes the duty to see that a
subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding is afforded the opportunity
to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless
effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.
Id. at 396.
41. 387 U.S. at 33.
42. Id. at 41. The Court also held that if a person is indigent, counsel will be
appointed. Id.
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id. at 55.
[Vol. 52
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stating the affiant's belief that a person was in need of care and treatment
for mental illness or inebriety, the clerk of court would hold a hearing to
determine whether such a need existed, following an examination and
certification by two physicians.45 If the clerk decided that a person was
in need of care and treatment, he could order hospitalization for a period
not to exceed 180 days. 46  Although the statute required that notice
of the hearing be given to the patient,47 the notice was not required
to be timely and adequate. 48  Moreover, the statute did not grant a
right to counsel that included meaningful notice of this right, full oppor-
tunity to procure counsel, and the appointment of counsel for indigents.
A number of courts have held that the right to counsel exists for all
persons being involuntarily committed to a mental institution.49
In order to provide meaningful representation, counsel should be
provided at all significant pre-hearing stages of the commitment pro-
ceedings. 50 The most significant pre-hearing stage in the North Caro-
lina procedure was the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation interview by
two physicians provided for in section 122-62. 51 In most situations,
this examination would be determinative since this was usually the only
evidence relied upon by the committing clerk.52  The possibility of life-
time institutionalization based on an interview consisting of three or
four questions and possibly lasting only a few minutes compels at least
the passive presence of counsel who might serve to eliminate most of
these problems and add a measure of procedural fairness to the com-
mitment process.5"
Other constitutional infirmities of the old statute include the lack
of adequate confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.54 For
example, the examining physicians were not required to be present at
the hearing and, as noted previously, the affidavits of the doctors essen-
45. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1650-51 (re-
pealed 1973).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
49. E.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325
F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Popp, 33 Ohio App. 2d 22, -, 292 N.E.
2d 330, 335 (1972); State v. Collman, 9 Ore. App. 476, 482-83, 497 P.2d 1233, 1237
(1972); see quote in note 40 supra.
50. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
51. Hayes Brief 33.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 34.
54. Id. at 37.
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tially determined the clerk of court's decision. 5  The Court in Gault
expressly held that the right to confrontation and cross-examination
could not be denied in juvenile hearings.50 This view was extended in
Specht v. Patterson57 where the Court was dealing with a mental com-
mitment procedure which could be instituted upon the conviction of cer-
tain crimes:
Due process in other words, requires that [the defendant] be with
counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with
witnesses against him, have the right to cross examine, and to
offer evidence of his own. And there must be findings adequate
to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed.68
Under section 122-59, the emergency hospitalization section, a
person who was believed to be suddenly violent and dangerous to him-
self or others could have been committed for a period of up to twenty
days. The authorization for such commitment was given either
by a physician who had examined the person within twenty-four
hours or by the clerk based on the affidavit of anyone "having knowl-
edge of the facts," but only if it were believed that it would be danger-
ous for a physician to make an examination. 9 This procedure allowed
a person to be held for a period of twenty days, and possibly longer,
without a hearing. Arguably, to hold a person more than a few days
without judicial contact is constitutionally suspect 0 since even a crimi-
nal suspect must be given his first judicial hearing "without unneces-
sary delay."0 1  The New York Court of Appeals has held unconstitu-
tional a proceeding that involuntarily committed a narcotics addict for
three days without opportunity to be heard, 62 and at least one court
has held that a probable cause hearing for involuntary commitment
must be held within forty-eight hours after a person is taken into cus-
tody and a full court hearing within ten to fourteen days.63
The procedures that were not affected by the decision in Hayes but
were repealed by the 1973 legislation were admission by medical certi-
55. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
56. 387 U.S. at 56-57.
57. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
58. Id. at 610.
59. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [19631 N.C. Sess. Laws 1648-49 (re-
pealed 1973).
60. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
61. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).
62. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n v. James, 22 N.Y.2d 545, 240 N.E.2d
29, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1968).
63. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
596 [Vol. 52
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fication6 4 and voluntary admission."5 Although these procedures were
not held unconstitutional, if placed squarely before the courts today, it is
unlikely that either procedure would withstand constitutional scrutiny
due to the lack of certain procedural safeguards.
Admission by medical certification has often been classified as a
non-protested involuntary admission as distinguished from a voluntary
admission 0 since admission was not voluntarily initiated by the af-
firmative action of the patient himself but by two physicians with
the patient's acquiescence.6 7 The procedure required the affidavit of
two qualified physicians stating that a person was mentally ill or ine-
briate and in need of care and treatment. The person was then sent
to a mental hospital. The clerk of court was not necessarily involved
in this procedure, but if the patient or any member of his family ob-
jected to the admission, a judicial commitment had to be instituted.68
If, after the admission, the patient or any member of his family
objected, they had to file an affidavit stating their objections with
the clerk of court within sixty days after the admission. The clerk
would then hold a hearing. The statute was silent as to what
happened if a timely objection was not made. Presumably, and
this was the interpretation the hospitals followed, the objection was
waived.6 This interpretation was questionable since waiver of a
right is valid only when knowingly and consciously given,7 0 and
there were no provisions requiring that notice of the right to ob-
ject be given to the person or his family either before or after admis-
sion. Moreover, with no maximum period being set by the statute,
confinement might have been indefinite after the sixty days had
passed. Physicians who may have had no psychiatric background
were thus given the power to make a decision that might have resulted in
indefinite institutionalization with no judicial check on the procedure.
64. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1647-48 (re-
pealed 1973).
65. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1647 (repealed
1973).
66. MENTALLY DISABLED 18.
67. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1647-48 (re-
pealed 1973).
68. Id.
69. Address by Robert A. Hassell, co-author of North Carolina's new involuntary
commitment laws, before the Deputies and Assistant Clerks of Court in Charlotte,
North Carolina, Aug. 3, 1973. A copy of this address is on file in the N.C. Law
Review office.
70. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
1974]
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Under the voluntary admission procedures," a person who felt
that he was mentally ill or inebriate could voluntarily admit himself
to the proper hospital upon filling out an application for admission.
Although there was no court intervention, the applicant did need the
written statement of a qualified physician stating that the applicant
was a fit and proper subject for admission. Once admitted, the only
way a person could be released was to give the superintendent ten
days written notice of his desire to be discharged. If it were determined
that the person should not be admitted for less than thirty days, the super-
intendent could have the patient sign a special form agreeing to admit
himself for thirty days. This consent form could be enforced upon the
patient for that period. These procedures were constitutionally suspect
for there were no provisions requiring that prior to admission the patient
be informed that he would not be entitled to leave until he gave the
hospital ten days written notice of his desire to leave, or that if he
signed the thirty-day agreement, the hospital could force him to stay
the entire period. At least one state supreme court has held a similar
voluntary procedure unconstitutional on its face.72
Although Hayes dealt only with the constitutionality of the emer-
gency and judicial commitment statutes, it was apparent that all of
North Carolina's commitment and admission procedures were consti-
tutionally questionable and in need of revision. The trial court's deci-
sion was handed down just prior to the 1973 Session of the General
Assembly; therefore, emergency legislation by the General Assembly
was required since the state was without adequate mental commitment
laws." This legislative haste possibly accounts for many of the ad-
ministrative problems presently being experienced under the new laws
and some of the constitutional infirmities.
If. TiIE NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAWS IN NORTH CAROLINA
During the past twenty years state legislatures have been more
concerned with the treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill than
with the problem of wrongful commitment."4 Due to advances in psychi-
71. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, [1963] N.C. Sess. Laws 1647 (repealed
1973).
72. Exparte Romero. 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947).
73. The trial decision in the Hayes case was handed down on October 20, 1972.
Immediately, the State of North Carolina petitioned the court of appeals for certiorari
and asked for a stay of execution of the trial court order. The court of appeals al-
lowed certiorari but denied the motion for a stay of execution. 18 N.C. App. at 562,
197 S.E.2d at 583.
74. MENTALLY DiSABLED 35.
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atric technique and greater understanding of the characteristics of men-
tal illness, legislators have been supplied with the factual basis neces-
sary for the enactment of laws most conducive to effective treatment
of persons who are in fact mentally disabled.7 5 Less formalized com-
mitment procedures have been advocated by the medical profession
because of the allegedly detrimental effect cumbersome legal machinery
might have on a mentally ill person. 76 Although North Carolina's
new mental health laws do not fall within the category of liberalized
commitment proceedings, they recognize that a person committed under
the involuntary commitment procedures has the same due process
rights as any other citizen who might be deprived of his liberty. Under
the new mental health laws there are two major articles: voluntary
admission 77 and involuntary commitment.78
A. Voluntary Admission.
The new voluntary admission procedures reflect the legislature's
recognition that mental illness79 and inebriety8" are illnesses which,
from an admissions standpoint, should be treated in the same manner
as any physical illness. Under the new procedures any person may seek
treatment in any treatment facility without formal or written applica-
tion for evaluation or admission.81 Such a procedure has been labeled
"informal" voluntary admission in order to distinguish it from "for-
mal" voluntary admission, which was characteristic of the old North
Carolina admissions statute.8 2  Under the informal admission proce-
dure, a person is admitted on precisely the same basis that he would
be admitted to any general hospital for any disorder. 3  No papers
75. Id.
76. See M. GuTrmAcHER & H. WErmoFFEN, PsYCHIATRY AND Tn LAw 288-89
(1952).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-56.1 to -57 (Supp. 1973).
78. Id. §§ 122-58.1 to -58.8 (Supp. 1973).
79. Id. § 122-36(d) (1964) defines "mental illness" as
an illness which so lessens the capacity of the person to use his customary
self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs, and social
relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under treatment,
care, supervision, guidance, or control.
80. Id. § 122-36(c) (1964) defines "inebriate" as
a person habitually so addicted to alcoholic drinks or narcotic drugs or other
habit forming drugs as to have lost the power of self-control and that for his
own welfare or the welfare of others is a proper subject for restraint, care,
and treatment.
81. Id. § 122-56.3 (Supp. 1973).
82. MENTALLY DIsABLED 18-19.
83. Id.
19741
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are signed except possibly financial responsibility or insurance forms,
and the person is free to leave at any time.
The new procedures require that once a person presents himself
for admission, he must be examined and evaluated by a qualified phy-
sician within twenty-four hours. If the person is accepted for treat-
ment and care, the treatment facility must notify him in writing within
twenty-four hours of acceptance that he has a right to be discharged
upon request, and a form must be provided which upon his signing
entitles him to immediate discharge. Although eight states provide for
informal admission procedures, 4 only five require that hospital officials
notify the person of his right to discharge upon written request.8r How-
ever, failure to provide this notification has been criticized since a
right is illusory without knowledge of it. 6 If the person admitted
to the facility has knowledge of this discharge procedure and submits
a written request for release to a member of the staff prior to the
required notification by the facility, he also must be discharged im-
mediately.
Although informal admission has been more favorably received
than formal voluntary admission in some states,87 North Carolina's new
informal admission procedures have been criticized. 8  The criticism
stems primarily from the lack of any control over the person ac-
cepted for admission. Since a person must be accepted if he is in need
of treatment and care but at the same time must be released immediately
upon written notice of his desire to be discharged, the procedure has
been frequently abused, primarily by persons seeking treatment for in-
ebriety. The phrase "revolving door" patient is used to describe the
inebriated person who comes in to "dry out" overnight and then dis-
charges himself the following morning.80 This process may be re-
84. Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee. Id.
85. Illinois, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Id.
86. Id. at 23.
87. See generally Congressional Hearings 27.
88. Hearings on the Involuntary Commitment Act Before the Senate Judiciary
I Comm., 1974 Sess. of N.C. Gen. Assembly 5 (Oct. 12, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
First Senate Hearing]; Hearings on the Involuntary Commitment Act Before the
Senate Judiciary I Comm., 1974 Sess. of N.C. Gen. Assembly 8-9 (Oct. 19, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Second Senate Hearing]; Hearings on the Involuntary Commitment
Act Before the Senate Judiciary I Comm., 1974 Sess. of N.C. Gen. Assembly 5, 17
(Nov. 2, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Third Senate Hearing]. Minutes to the above
hearings are on file in the N.C. Law Review office.
89. Second Senate Hearing 8-9; The Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 8, 1973,
at 20, col. 2.
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peated several times, and some facilities have actually had the same per-
son check in and out several times in the same day.90
This type of abuse raises two major problems. The first and most
serious is that in most cases treatment will have begun under which
the person is given certain drugs. These drugs may have serious side
affects if the person is not carefully watched and regulated until the
drug is no longer effective. 91  If a person is discharged immediately
after receiving such treatment and drives his car, serious consequences
could result. This situation places the treatment facilities in a pre-
carious position since refusal to release a person until the drug has
worn off violates the admission statute and subjects them to a suit for
false imprisonment, and permitting release subjects them to civil lia-
bility if a person released under the influence of drugs causes an acci-
dent. The second problem is that the paper work involved in check-
ing a person in and out and the assigning of physicians and staff to
attend to the person results in an administrative nightmare for the facil-
ity.92
A number of approaches might be used to stop his abuse. One
approach would be to continue the informal admission procedure but
retain from the formal admission procedures the requirement that re-
lease be granted within five days9" after written request from the per-
son unless he is released earlier by the superintendent of the treatment
facility. An explanation of all present notice requirements and the
new delayed discharge procedure should be given in writing and orally94
to the person not only within twenty-four hours after accepting the
person but also immediately upon the person's request for admission.
The person should be informed that if the physician finds him accep-
table for treatment and further psychiatric evaluation, he has the right
to be discharged upon five days advance written request. The reason
for requiring notice to be given to the person upon his presentation for
admission is that under the present law the physician is given twenty-
four hours to determine whether or not to accept a person for care and
treatment and, upon acceptance, notice is required within twenty-four
90. Third Senate Hearing 17.
91. Id.
92. Id. Attachment D at 3, Attachment E at 1.
93. Dr. Irigary, Superintendent of Umstead Hospital, has indicated that five days
would be an absolute minimum to analyze the problems of an alcoholic patient. Id.
at 16-17.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-56.3 (Supp. 1973) does not presently require oral no.
tice but only written. The statute should be changed to provide oral as well as written
notice. " :. -. .. ..
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hours.9" Therefore it is possible that forty-eight hours would lapse be-
fore the person would be notified of his right to discharge. If the five
day advance notice requirement was imposed, it could be seven days
before a person would be discharged. A procedure in which a per-
son is restrained against his will when he requests to leave may be con-
stitutionally suspect unless there are compelling reasons for such re-
straint. Restraint for an amount of time necessary for the side effects
of drugs to wear off would provide reasonable grounds for detention.
However, since the effect of most drugs does not last longer than twen-
ty-four to forty-eight hours,9" the five day limitation requested by
the medical profession might be constitutionally infirm in light of Ex
parte Romero97 which held unconstitutional a ten day restraint under
a formal voluntary admission statute.
A less constitutionally suspect approach would be continue the
informal procedures as they now exist but authorize the treatment facil-
ity to keep a person long enough after his request for discharge for
any drugs to wear off, but in no event longer than forty-eight hours.
In addition, the treatment facility director or superintendent would be
given the discretion whether or not to readmit a person who has abused
the informal procedures.98 Under either of the above approaches, if a
person who is voluntarily admitted requests discharge, there would be
sufficient time to commence involuntary commitment procedures if it
were determined that the person meets the requirements set forth in the
involuntary commitment statute.
B. Involuntary Commitment.
North Carolina's new policy for involuntary commitments is to in-
sure that "no person shall be committed to a treatment facility unless he
is determined to be dangerous to himself or others or gravely disabled." 9
95. Id.
96. Telephone interview with Dr. Peter Witts, Chief of Research Services, Dep't
of Human Resources, Division of Mental Health Services, Jan. 30, 1974. Dr. Witts
noted that the longer a person is under treatment, the longer the time period for the
serious effects of the drugs to wear off. For example, if only one injection is given to
a person, then it may only take two or three hours for the drug to wear off; however,
if injections are given on a normal basis for two or three days, it may take 24 to 48
hours for the serious side effects of the drugs to wear off.
97. 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947).
98. Presently the director of the inpatient service at the Psychiatric Training and
Research Center at the South Wing of the North Carolina Memorial Hospital at Chap-
el Hill is given the discretion to approve admissions but no other director or superinten-
dent of a treatment facility is so authorized. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-56.2(d) (Supp.
1973).
99. Id. § 122-58.1 (Supp. 1973).
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It is also the policy of the state to insure that commitment will be
under conditions that "protect the dignity and rights of the person
.... 9100 From an examination of the sections that make up this
article, it is apparent that the term "rights" as used in the policy declara-
tion was intended to refer to a person's constitutional right to due proc-
ess. The new section that authorizes the initiation of the commitment
procedures provides that a person may be involuntarily committed in
only one of two ways-judicial hospitalization or emergency hospital-
ization.'01
Under the judicial hospitalization section, a law enforcement of-
ficer102 is given authority to take into custody any person who, "by
reason of the commission of overt acts, is determined . . . to be vio-
lent and of imminent danger to himself or others, or to gravely dis-
abled . ... "oz The term "gravely disabled" is defined as "unable
because of mental illness or inebriety to provide for the basic personal
needs for food, clothing or shelter.' 0° 4 The term "overt acts" is not de-
fined in the statute and is presumably left to judicial interpretation.
Once the officer has made the determination that a person is
either violent and of imminent danger to himself or others or gravely
disabled, he is required to take the person to a qualified physician'0 5
and obtain a medical examination and evaluation within twenty-four
hours. The section also provides that a qualified physician may initiate
the judicial procedures, and under such circumstances, the determina-
tion by the law enforcement officer is removed from the procedure and
the qualified physician makes the initial determination as to whether
the person is within the coverage of the statute. 0
Authorization for the law enforcement officer to retain custody
of the person after the examination and evaluation depends on the phy-
sician's determination. If the physician finds the person falls within
100. Id.
101. Id. § 122-58.3 (Supp. 1973).
102. "Law enforcement officer" is defined as any sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable,
police officer and highway patrolman. Id. § 122-58.2(d) (Supp. 1973).
103. Id. § 122-58.3(1) (Supp. 1973).
104. Id. § 122-58.2(b) (Supp. 1973).
105. Id. § 122-36(f) (1964) defines a "qualified physician" as a
medical doctor who is duly licensed by this State to practice medicine; pro-
vided, however, that no physician is to be considered a "qualified physician"
with respect to any procedure to hospitalize any person who is related by
blood or marriage to the said physician.
It should be noted that clinical psychologists are not included in this definition which
is questionable in light of their background and training in the mental health area.
106. Id. § 122-58.3(1) (Supp. 1973).
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the statutory language, he must submit a written statement that he has
examined the person within twenty-four hours of his statement and
found the person to come within the statute. He must set forth in his
statement the overt acts upon which his professional opinion is based.
Once the officer has the physician's written statement, he has the au-
thorization to retain custody of the person and to bring him before a
magistrate within seventy-two hours. 107
When the person is brought before the magistrate, the magistrate
holds a hearing in which he must determine if there are "reasonable
grounds" to believe that by reason of overt acts, the person falls within
the statutory language. 08 In making this determination the magistrate
is required to "take and consider" oral testimony and he "may" con-
sider the physician's written statement. The use of the term "may"
has been questioned since it would be highly unusual if the magistrate
did not consider the statement of the physician in light of the medical
questions involved in such a proceeding. 0 9
Upon hearing all the evidence, the magistrate will either release
the person or order him to be taken to a treatment facility to be ex-
amined by another physician. The examination and evaluation must
be made within twenty-four hours after the person's arrival at the
treatment facility."10 The person will remain at the facility pending a
hearing in district court unless the examining physician at the facility
determines that the person is not violent and of imminent danger to
himself or others or gravely disabled, and then the person may be re-
leased until the district court hearing."'
Under the emergency hospitalization section only a law enforce-
ment officer may initiate commitment procedures."12 If the officer has
"reasonable grounds" to believe that the delay in obtaining a medical
examination and evaluation would endanger life or property, he is au-
thorized to take the person before a magistrate immediately. Although
there is no specific time limit designated, the term "immediately" im-
plies that there should be no delay in taking the person before a magis-
trate regardless of what time of day the person is taken into custody.
The only difference between the emergency and judicial procedure is
the determination, based on a reasonable belief, that life or property
107. Id.
108. Id. § 122-58.4(a) (Supp. 1973).
109. See text accompanying notes 169-73 infra.
110. N.C. GEN. SAT. § 122-58.5(a) (Supp. 1973).
111. Id. § 122-58.5(b)(1)(a) (Supp. 1973).
112. Id. § 122-58.3(2) (Supp. 1973).
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would be endangered if the person were taken to a physician. Such
a distinction could easily lead to abuse of the emergency procedure
since a law enforcement officer's determination that a person is violent
and of imminent danger to himself or others, by its the very nature,
indicates that life or property would be endangered if there were delays
in presenting this person before the magistrate.
Once the person is brought before the magistrate, an order for the
person's release must be made if the magistrate determines either
that there are not reasonable grounds to believe, based on overt
acts, that the person is violent and of imminent danger to him-
self or others or is gravely disabled, or that there are not reasonable
grounds to believe that the delay in obtaining a medical examination
would have endangered life or property.118  Under this requirement,
it is possible for the magistrate to find that the person is violent and of
imminent danger to himself or others but that life or property would not
be endangered by delay in obtaining a medical examination. In this
situation, the magistrate must release the person. It would seem more
logical that the law enforcement officer should take the person to a phy-
sician and thereby begin the judicial proceeding. If such an approach
is used by the law enforcement officers, the section should expressly
authorize such a variance; otherwise, the requirement of "release" is
merely illusory.
As in the judicial proceeding, the magistrate must take and con-
sider oral testimony in making his determination. If the magistrate
determines that the person should not be released, he will order him to
be taken to a treatment facility for the purpose of obtaining a medical
examination and evaluation the results of which must be furnished to
the magistrate within forty-eight hours after the person's arrival at the
facility or the person will be released from custody.'14
The physician at the treatment facility must examine and evaluate
the person within twenty-four hours of his arrival and make the deter-
mination of whether the person is violent and of imminent danger to
himself or others or gravely disabled." 5  This determination must be
113. Id. § 122-58.4(b) (Supp. 1973).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 122-58.5(a) (Supp. 1973). This section requires the physician at the
treatment facility to make his determination based on the examination of the person
without specifying what "overt acts" his opinion is based upon. This deletion was
probably an oversight by the drafters but it could be interpreted to allow the physicians
to consider a person's history of mental illnesses or inebriety as well as present "overt
acts." Since most psychiatric diagnoses are based primarily on a persons mental his.
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made in the form of a written statement recording the reasons for the
decision and must be sent to the magistrate within twenty-four hours
of the medical examination. 116 Upon receiving this statement, the
magistrate will again determine if there are reasonable grounds to be-
lieve the person falls within the statutory language. If the magistrate so
determines, he will order the person to remain in custody at the treat-
ment facility. If the written statement of the physician found the
person not to be within the statute, the magistrate will release him pend-
ing the district court hearing. 117
Section 122-58.6(a) provides for a district court hearing that
must be held within five days, or for good cause shown, within ten days
after the person is taken into custody."" Notice of the hearing must
be given to the person and his attorney forty-eight hours prior to the
hearing. 19 The person has the right to counsel at the hearing, but
this right may be waived with the consent of the court.12 0  This provi-
sion appears to be in conflict with another provision that provides for
the mandatory appointment of counsel at the time of the hearing or
prior to it if the judge finds that the person is without counsel.' 21 Al-
though this latter provision is primarily concerned with the appoint-
ment of counsel for the indigent, whether the person is indigent or not,
he is appointed counsel and charged with an attorney's fee if he can
afford to pay it. Obviously, if this provision were to be strictly ad-
hered to, constitutional issues might be raised as to a person's right
to choose whether to be represented. Therefore the interpretation
which should be given this section is that the provision allowing a per-
son to waive counsel with the court's consent should control.' 22
The section also states that a person must be present at the hearing
and that this right may be waived only upon the written recommenda-
tion of the person's attorney and the concurrence of the court.'2 8 A
tory, the statute should specifically provide for considering such records as well as overt
acts. Hearings on the Involuntary Commitment Act Before the Senate Judiciary I
Committee, 1974 Sess. of N.C. Gen. Assembly 2 (Nov. 9, 1973).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.5(b)(2) (Supp. 1973).
117. Id. § 122-58.4(b) (Supp. 1973).
118. Id. § 122-58.6(b) (Supp. 1973) provides that if the hearing is not held and
a written order for commitment signed by the district court judge within ten days, the
person will be released from custody immediately and from the treatment facility.
119. Id. § 122-58.6(a) (Supp. 1973).
120. Id. § 122-58.6(e) (Supp. 1973).
121. Id. § 122-58.6(c) (Supp. 1973).
122. Id. § 122-58.6(e) (Supp. 1973).
123. Id. § 122-58.6(d) (Supp. 1973).
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person is entitled to a transcript of the hearing 24 and the right to ap-
peal to the superior court for a hearing de novo, which includes the
right to a jury determination if requested.125 If the person is indigent,
the state will bear the cost of the appointed attorney12" and the trans-
cript.1 27
The district court judge will make the same determination that has
previously been made by the law enforcement officer, physicians, and
magistrate: whether, by reason of the commission of overt acts, the
person is violent and of imminent danger to himself or others or is
gravely disabled. If the judge so determines, he will order the person
committed to the appropriate treatment facility for a period not to ex-
ceed ninety days. 28 If an appeal is taken, the section is silent as to
what should be done with the person pending the superior court hear-
ing. Presumably, the person is returned to the treatment facility.
A problem arises, however, if the person requests a jury determination
since in some North Carolina counties jury trials in superior court are
only held every three or four months." 9 Therefore, a person could
be held at a treatment facility for ninety days or more waiting for his
superior court hearing de novo. Such a procedure might be consti-
tutionally suspect in addition to creating the anomalous situation where
a person may be entitled to his ninety-day rehearing of right in the
district court before he receives his superior court hearing de novo.
If no appeal is taken and the superintendent of the treatment
facility determines that the person will be in need of treatment beyond
the initial ninety-day commitment period, he must make a request for
a rehearing to the chief district court judge at least thirty days before
the end of the initial period. 3 The request must be in writing and
a copy must be given the person and his attorney. Notice of the re-
hearing must also be given to the person and his attorney at least fifteen
days in advance. The hearing must be conducted in accordance with
the same procedures and due process safeguards present in the original
124. Id. § 122-58.6(f) (Supp. 1973).
125. Id. § 122.58.6(g) (Supp. 1973).
126. Id. § 122-58.6(c) (Supp. 1973).
127. Id. § 122-58.6(f) (Supp. 1973).
128. Id. § 122-58.7(a) (Supp. 1973).
129. North Carolina's constitution requires that jury trials be held in each county
at least twice a year. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9(2). According to the annual supe-
rior court calendar for the 1973-74 sessions, a number of counties provide for holding
superior court with a jury available only twice during each six month session. See
[1973-74] CALENDAR OF COURTS, THn SUPERIOR COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA, (adopted
annually by the Supreme Court of North Carolina).
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(b) (Supp. 1973).
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hearing. 13' The district court judge may order recommitment up to a
period not to exceed 120 days, and any further rehearings must be con-
ducted in the same manner.'32 A person involuntarily committed may
be discharged from the treatment facility at any time prior to the ex-
piration of the commitment period by the superintendent or director of
the facility.'3 3
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW COMMITMENT LAws
Although the Hayes decision gave no guidelines to legislators in
adopting the new involuntary commitment laws, many of the due proc-
ess safeguards required by Gault and other recent decisions that have
specifically set forth due process standards for mental commitments were
incorporated in North Carolina's new laws. However, there are a
number of areas in the new laws that are constitutionally suspect be-
cause they do not adequately provide the procedural safeguards which
have been required by some recent decisions.
A. The Right to a Prelimindry Hearing Within Forty-Eight Hours.
As noted previously, North Carolina's new commitment proce-
dures provide for both a preliminary hearing-the magistrate's "rea-
sonable grounds" determination' 3 -- and a full hearing in district
court.' 35 The full hearing must be held within five days, or for
good cause shown, within ten days after a person is taken into cus-
tody."'36 The problem, however, is that the preliminary hearing itself is
not specifically required to be held for at least four days.
The initiating law enforcement officer under the judicial commit-
ment procedures is given twenty-four hours to find a qualified physi-
cian and obtain an examination and evaluation of the person in cus-
tody.137 Although the physician is allowed twenty-four hours from
the time of his examination to write his statement, the written state-
ment must also be provided within the initial twenty-four hours after
the person is taken into custody in order for the law enforcement offi-
cer to retain custody of the person. 138  Upon receiving the written
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 122-58.8 (Supp. 1973).
134. Id. § 122-58.4 (Supp. 1973).
135. Id. § 122-58.6 (Supp. 1973).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 122-58.3(1) (Supp. 1973).
138. Id. Although the section is silent as to what results in the situation where
the doctor completes his examination of the person within the initial 24 hour period
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statement from the physician, the officer is given an additional seventy-
two hours in which to take the person to a magistrate.' 3 9 As a result,
a maximum of four days is permitted before a preliminary hearing is
required.
In a recent decision, Lessard v. Schmidt, 40 in which the Wiscon-
sin civil commitment procedures were declared unconstitutional, a
federal three-judge court held that due process requires that a pre-
liminary hearing must be held within forty-eight hours after a person
is taken into custody.' 4' The court justified this time limitation on the
grounds that at this stage in the process, the necessity for commitment
has not yet been established and to allow "even a short detention in a
mental facility may have long lasting effects on the individual's ability
to function in the outside world due to the stigma attached to mental
illness."' 42
There appears to be no justification in the new laws for allowing up
to four days for the preliminary hearing to be held. It has been recorded
in one community in North Carolina that the average time spent by a
law enforcement officer from the time he takes a person into custody,
obtains a medical evaluation, takes the person before a magistrate,
and then to a treatment facility is five hours. 43 Since magistrates are
on call twenty-four hours a day in most county seats, 144 the law enforce-
ment officer does not need three days to take a person before a magis-
trate. The maximum amount of time allowed by the new procedures
before a preliminary hearing must be held is constitutionally suspect
and should be brought more in line with the forty-eight hour limitation
imposed by the Lessard court.
B. The Right to Meaningful Representation of Counsel.
Another area that is constitutionally questionable under North
Carolina's new laws is the scope of the right to counsel. Implicit in
but does not complete his written statement, presumably the officer must release the
person from custody. If the officer retains custody of the person during this interim,
he may be subjecting himself to civil liability.
139. Id.
140. 349 F. Supp- 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
141. Id. at 1091.
142. Id.
143. Third Senate Hearing 8.
144. Magistrates are required to be on call 24 hours a day in most county seats
and in some of the larger cities, they may be on duty 24 hours a day. This is by
order of the chief district judge in each district. If a magistrate, whether on call or
on duty, needs to leave his area of the county, he must get another magistrate or the
clerk of superior court to stand in for him.
1974] 609
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the right to meaningful representation by counsel is the right to have
counsel present at all significant pre-hearing stages.1 "5 In United
States v. Wade,146 the Supreme Court held counsel was necessary at a
compulsory police lineup because this pre-trial proceeding "might
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere for-
mality.' 147 An analogy can be drawn between the effect that a pre-trial
police lineup without counsel has on a trial and the effect that a psychi-
atric hearing evaluation interview without counsel has on mental com-
mitment proceedings. As stated in a recent survey of American law:
A mental commitment hearing is little more than a "hollow" for-
mality since, "for all practical purposes," commitment is assured
by the prehearing psychiatric examination. It is extremely diffi-
cult to destroy the credibility of a psychiatrist's opinion by cross-
examination because that opinion is based largely on the psychia-
trist's version of what the prospective patient said or did during
the psychiatric interview. The prospective patient can offer his
own version, but it will generally be ignored.' 48
The most significant pre-hearing stage under the old commitment
procedures in North Carolina was the psychiatric evaluation interview
because of its conclusory effect on the decision of the clerk of superior
court in determining whether to commit a person. 49 Under the new
laws there are several pre-hearing stages-the initial psychiatric evalua-
tion interview, the preliminary hearing, and the final psychiatric
evaluation-all of which may be considered significant.
The court in Lessard held that a detained individual must have
counsel at the preliminary hearing on detention since the need for
commitment has not been established at this stage and an attorney
may be able to prepare some initial defenses.' 50 Some counties in
North Carolina are presently providing attorneys at the magistrate's
hearing, but the statute does not require the presence of counsel at this
stage.' 8 '
The need for counsel at the psychiatric evaluation interview was
also addressed by the Lessard court, but the conclusion was that the
right to effective counsel was outweighed by the, state's interest in
145. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Hayes Brief 33.
146. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
147. Id. at 224.
148. N.Y.U., ANNuAL SURvEY OF AMauc~A LAw 38 (1969-70).
149. Hayes Brief 33.
150. 349 F. Supp. at 1092, 1099.
151. Second Senate Hearing 10.
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meaningful consultation. 152 The court drew an analogy to the criminal
law area where a mental examination is required when an accused raises
the defense of insanity.153 The presence of counsel at the mental ex-
amination has not been allowed since the examination is of an inti-
mate and personal nature and the presence of a third party in a legal
and non-medical capacity would severely limit its efficacy. 5 4  How-
ever, the court did require that the state provide other means of main-
taining the person's rights to effective counsel such as recording the in-
terview and making available the written results to the defense coun-
sel.155
North Carolina's new laws do not provide for any alternative
means of protecting the individual's rights at either of the psychia-
tric evaluation interviews. The possibility of misunderstanding between
the physician and the person detained and the uncertainty that still
exists in the field of mental health'56 compel that counsel at least be
provided a recording of the psychiatric evaluation in order to point
out to the magistrate at the preliminary hearing or to the judge at
the district court hearing any irregularities and possible misunderstand-
ings that may have influenced the physician's determination. The in-
itial psychiatric interview may not be as significant as the interview at
the treatment facility since psychiatrists usually make the examination
at the treatment facility whereas physicians who are not psychiatrists
usually make the initial psychiatric evaluation. However, the initial
interview may still have a conclusive effect on the magistrate's de-
termination or even that of the district court judge. Without a record-
ing or a transcript of the interview, an attorney is not allowed to pursue
fully any possible initial defenses that the detained person may have.
C. The Right to the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
Another serious constitutional problem with the new laws is the
lack of notice to the person, prior to the psychiatric interview, of the
privilege against self-incrimination. In Gault the privilege against
152. 349 F. Supp. at 1100.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The California mental health act which is very similar to North Caro-
lina's new act has also come under attack for not providing counsel at the psychiatric
evaluation interview. Comment, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental
Health Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 851 (1970); Comment, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill in California: 1969 Style, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 74 (1969).
156. Roth, Dayley, & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emer-
gency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 400 (1973).
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self-incrimination was held to be applicable to juvenile delinquent
proceedings since one of the purposes of the privilege is "to prevent
the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from over-
coming the mind and will of the person under investigation and de-
priving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in se-
curing his conviction.' 7  Most patients do not realize that the psychia-
tric interview is not designated to treat them but to evaluate them
for the purpose of commitment 5 8  In McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Institution'59 the United States Supreme Court did not find it neces-
sary to reach the question of self-incrimination as it was raised by the
petitioner. 60 However, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion found
that the privilege was applicable:
Whatever the Patuxent procedures may be called-whether civil
or criminal-the result under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment is the same. As we said in the In re Gault...
there is harm and self-incrimination whenever there is "a depriva-
tion of liberty;" and there is such a deprivation whatever the name
of the institution, if a person is held against his will.' 8'
At least one court has found Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
McNeil and the underlying reasoning in Gault persuasive and held
that before a person may be interviewed, he must be told by counsel
and the psychiatrist that he is going to be examined with regard to his
mental condition, that the statements he makes may be the basis of
commitment, and that he does not have to speak to the psychiatrist. 6 2
D. The Right to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt of the Need for
Commitment.
Nowhere in the new laws is the standard for the state's burden of
proof in a commitment proceeding expressed. The United States Su-
157. 387 U.S. at 47.
158. Hayes Brief 45.
159. 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
160. McNeil involved the confinement of a criminal in a mental institution for
a period longer than his prison sentence because he refused to talk to the psychiatrists
thereby preventing them from evaluating him in order to determine if he should be
committed to the institution for an indeterminate term. Id.
161. Id. at 257.
162. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101 (E.D. Wis. 1972). As ex-
pressed by the concurring opinion in Haskett v. State, 255 Ind. 206, 263 N.E.2d 529
(1970):
[Rlegardless of the characterization of the proceedings, appellant, if forced
to testify, would subject himself to possible involuntary commitment. Before
such an individual is deprived of his liberty he must be accorded, in my opin-
ion, the basic and fundamental right against self-incrimination contemplated
by our concept of due process of law.
Id. at 213, 263 N.E.2d at 533.
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preme Court in In re Winship'6" conclusively held that the reasonable
doubt standard was to be applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings
that might result in loss of liberty.'64 In so holding, the Court re-
jected the "civil-criminal" distinction argument 6 5 as well as other
arguments that are usually invoked to justify the lack of due process
standards in mental commitments. 68 The risk of loss of liberty in a
commitment hearing is as great or greater than in a criminal prosecu-
tion because the "predictions of dangerous behavior are unreliable and
because 'mental illness' is, at best, an illusory concept."' t67 As a result,
numerous lower courts have held that the burden of proof must be be-
yond a reasonable doubt in civil commitment proceedings. 68  Al-
though this reasonable doubt standard may be read into the new North
Carolina laws by judicial interpretation, the statute should specifically
provide such a standard.
E. The Right to Exclude Hearsay Evidence and Compulsory Attend-
ance of Witnesses.
Another area of the new laws that raises constitutional questions
is the degree of formality that is allowed with respect to the admission
of evidence at the preliminary and district court hearings. As to the
preliminary hearing, the magistrate is required to "take and consider"
oral testimony, and he "may" consider the physician's written state-
ment. 69 From the language in the statute requiring the taking of
"evidence" and oral "testimony" and the drafting of a written order
containing the "findings of fact" by the magistrate, it would appear
that only testimony from first hand knowledge should be admissible at
the preliminary hearing, and hearsay testimony should be excluded.'1 0
Under this interpretation, if a law enforcement officer reasonably relied
upon the statements of a family member or friend of the person being
163. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
164. Id. at 368.
165. Id. at 365.
166. The Court rejected the argument that the purpose of the juvenile's commit-
ment---" 'not to punish, but to save the child' "-can override the need for a reasonable
doubt standard as well as the argument that the "beneficial aspects" of the juvenile
process would be destroyed by the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 366-67.
167. Hayes Brief 23, 40-41.
168. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); see Denton
v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964); cf. Dixon v. Attorney General, 325
F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) '(clear and convincing). See also Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.4 (Supp. 1973).
170. Id.
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committed in making his initial determination, those having first hand
knowledge would have to testify before the magistrate as to the overt
acts they witnessed.
The problem, however, comes when the physician's written state-
ment is offered for consideration since it is objectionable as hearsay
testimony. 17 1 The section is worded so that the magistrate "may" con-
sider the physician's statement, but such wording does not change the
hearsay character of the evidence nor does it solve the lack of confronta-
tion and cross-examination that exists if the statement is considered by
the magistrate, which will almost always be the case due to the medical
questions involved.
The new lawsare -completely silent as to what evidence may be
considered by the district court judge at the full hearing, but presum-
ably, since a written statement of the physician at the treatment facility
is required prior to the hearing, this statement also "may" be considered
in the judge's determination. Although Gault did not rule directly on
the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the Court did provide strong
dicta that the hearsay rules should not be rejected in any judicial in-
quiry,172 and this view is supported by lower court decisions which have
held the rules applicable to mental commitment proceedings.' 7 8  If
the physician's written statement is submitted in affidavit form to the
court, upon the attorney's objection, the affidavit should be excluded,
and the attorney should be allowed to compel the presence of the physi-
cian in order to confront and cross-examine him on his psychiatric eval-
uation. Although it may be implicit in the right to counsel, the new laws
do not expressly provide that a person through his counsel has the right
to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses who obviously
must be available in order for the attorney effectively to represent his
client.
F. The Standard for Commitment.
Under the new laws, there are two standards for commitment-
"violent and of imminent danger" to oneself or others or "gravely dis-
171. Hearsay evidence has been defined to include written evidence presented in
court of a statement made out of court, "the statement being offered as an assertion
to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." MCCORViICx ON EVMENCu § 246, at 584
(2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (emphasis omitted).
172. 387 U.S. at 11 n.7.
173. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Holm v. State,
404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965); see Dixon v. Attorney General, 323 F. Supp. 966 (M.D.
Pa. 1971); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
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abled." Both of these standards must be manifested in the form of
"overt acts" in order for a person to be committed. However, the new
laws do not require the finding that a person's violent and dangerous
behavior is caused by reason of mental illness or inebriety. 174  As
one court has noted, "Even an overt attempt -to substantially harm
oneself cannot be the basis for commitment unless the person is found
to be (1) mentally ill and (2) in immediate danger at the time of the
hearing of doing further harm to oneself."'1 75  Although a court would
probably read into the present standard the requirement of mental ill-
ness or inebriety, the new laws should make this explicit where appro-
priate. 176
The second standard-"gravely disabled"--does provide for the
finding of mental illness or inebriety as a cause of a person's inability
to provide for food, clothing, or shelter. 177  Although the standard
does not expressly require a finding of dangerousness, implicit in the
determination that a person cannot provide himself basic personal needs
is that he is dangerous to himself. Therefore, the requirement set forth
in one decision that civil confinement must be based on a finding of
"dangerousness" either to oneself or others178 is met by the gravely dis-
abled standard.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEW
COMMITMENT LAWS
At almost every stage of the commitment process, there are num-
erous problems in administering the new laws. Many of the problems
stem from a lack of experience with the new laws and a reluctance to
change from the old system; however, some of the problems are inherent
in the new statute and should be examined and resolved.
A. The Initiating Stage: Law Enforcement Officer.
One of the major criticisms of the new laws has come from the law
enforcement officer.' 7 9  He is the primary initiating force behind judi-
174. Third Senate Hearing 2.
175. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 n.24 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
176. It would be better to leave this finding of mental illness or inebriety out of
the initiating stages involving the law enforcement officer since he has no psychiatric
background; however, this finding should definitely be included in the physician's, mag-
istrate's and district court judge's determinations. See text accompanying notes 180-
83 infra.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2(b) (Supp. 1973).
178. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
179. First Senate Hearing 10; Second Senate Hearing 1-2; The Durham Sun, Oct.
17, 1973, at 16-.A, col. 1; id. Aug. 31, 1973, at 1-C.
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cial hospitalization and the only initiating force behind emergency hos-
pitalization. The officer's new role in initiating the involuntary com-
mitment procedures is carried on without any court authority-a ma-
jor change from his role under the old commitment laws. Previously,
when an officer took a person into custody, he had an order from the
clerk of court or the affidavit of a qualified physician as his authority.
His authority now comes directly from the statute.
This new procedure has been criticized as requiring the officer to
make psychiatric determinations for which he is not qualified.18 0  Un-
der the statute, a law enforcement officer may take into custody any
person who he determines by reason of the commission of overt acts is
violent and of imminent danger to himself or others or is gravely dis-
abled.181 Nowhere does the statute require the law enforcement officer
to make a psychiatric determination for the first grounds for custody
-violent and of imminent danger. In other words, the statute does
not require the law enforcement officer to determine that by reason of
mental illness or inebriety, the person is violent and of imminent dan-
ger to himself or others; rather, the officer is required to make the same
determination that he routinely makes in arresting a person for disor-
derly conduct or public drunkenness. The law enforcement officer is
now given some discretion; instead of taking a person to jail, he now may
take the person to a physician to determine whether the person is in
need of care and treatment for mental illness or inebriety.18 2 Police
initiated civil commitment has been favorably advocated as a viable al-
ternative to the criminal process where acts such as disorderly conduct,
theft, indecent exposure, assault, attempted suicide, or other acts of
similar nature have been committed.8 8
The second ground for custody--"gravely disabled"-does include
in its definition a psychiatric determination that a person's inability
to provide for basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter is be-
cause of mental illness or inebriety. In requiring the law enforce-
180. First Senate Hearing 3; Second Senate Hearing 9; The Durham Sun, Oct. 20,
1973, at 3A; id. Oct. 17, 1973, at 16-A.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3 (Supp. 1973).
182. An actual case example of the value of allowing the law enforcement officer
this discretion occurred when a man stole grapes in plain sight of the store owner
after daring him to call the police. The officer who arrived at the scene agreed that
the behavior was odd and instead of taking the man to jail, the officer took the man
to a hospital for an examination and evaluation. The results were that the man was
in need of mental treatment and received it rather than being put in jail. A. MAT-
THws, MENTAL DisAarLrrY AN THE C mmqAL LAw 176 (1970).
183. See generally id. at 169-70.
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ment officer to determine whether or not a person is gravely disabled,
it would seem appropriate to leave the causation issue out of the initiat-
ing stages, thus allowing the officer to bring in a person who is unable to
provide for his basic personal needs and to let the doctors and the
court determine whether such inability is due to mental illness or in-
ebriety. This approach would avoid any psychiatric determination by
the officer in the initiating stages under either grounds for custody.,
Although some officers have stated they will not accept this new
responsibility, much of their reluctance appears to come primarily from
the possibility of civil liability if they make the wrong determination.1 14
The new statutes do not include a provision to protect the officer from
civil liability if it is later determined that the person was not within the
statutory grounds for custody. However, under North Carolina com-
mon law a law enforcement officer is clothed with immunity for mere
negligence in, the performance of governmental duties involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion.'8 5 The officer may be held liable
only if his act or failure to act is corrupt or malicious or if he acts be-
yond the scope of his duties.18 6 However, an express statutory pro-
vision in the new laws for immunity from civil liability similar to those
in other North Carolina statutes'87 would be more comforting to offi-
cers than this case law immunity.1
8 8
A question that law enforcement officers and other people in-
volved in the commitment procedures have raised is how inclusive is
the phrase "overt acts." The phrase is not defined in the new laws but
left to judicial interpretation. Under the old emergency commitment
statute, the phrase "overt acts" was used in the same manner as it is
presently being used under the new laws,'8 9 but no cases under this old
statute addressed themselves to the meaning of the phrase. During the
hearings before the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Consti-
tutional Rights of the Mentally Il, Doctor Eugene Hargrove, Commis-
sioner of Mental Health for North Carolina, gave the following exam-
184. Second Senate Hearing 2, 5, 9.
185. 6 J. STRONo, N.C. INDEx 2d Public Officers § 9, at 516 (1968).
186. Id.
187. Under North Carolina's shoplifting statute, an officer who detains or causes
the arrest of a person will not be held civilly liable for detention, malicious prosecution,
false imprisonment, or false arrest where detention is in a reasonable manner and for
a reasonable time, if he had probable cause to believe that the person committed the
offense. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.1 (Supp. 1973).
188. For a discussion on the need for adequate legal protection for the law enforce-
ment officer, see A. MATrHEws, supra note 182, at 178-79.
189. Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2 [1963J N.C. Sess. Laws 1648-49 (re-
pealed 1973).
1974] 617
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ples of when emergency hospitalization under the old statutes would
be appropriate under the overt acts test:
The way the code is written at the present time, it indicates that
the act must be of a suicidal or homicidal nature. That if the per-
son, for example, is threatening suicide or threatening to harm
someone, that this can be taken as an overt act, and the person can
be hospitalized under the emergency provision.
Now an example of where we have had some concern re-
cently has particularly been with alcoholics, where there has been
not so much the threat in person or by word of either suicide or
homicide, but it has been more or less of an implied threat of
drinking oneself unconscious. We have had some instances where
some patients have been admitted under this emergency commit-
ment, and where there has not been an obvious overt act, and
they have been held for the 20-day period, whereas we think this
probably should not have been allowed in these instances ...
Our attorney general has told us that it is a violation.10°
Under this interpretation, both physical and verbal acts would come
within the scope of the phrase. The problem of whether unconscious
alcoholics come within the overt acts test should be resolved under the
new statutes since an unconscious alcoholic would be unable to provide
food, clothing, or shelter for himself and, therefore, would come within
the gravely disabled grounds for commitment. When applying the overt
acts test to a person appearing gravely disabled, a law enforcement of-
ficer would probably look for negative acts, that is, the absence of
proper behavior by an individual. An example would be the failure
to eat or attend to other basic personal needs extending over a period
long enough to constitute a hazard to his health.
A serious criticism of the law enforcement officer's new role is
the fact that the officer is the only one who may sign a petition for
judicial or emergency commitment, and the immediate family is re-
moved completely from the commitment process. 1 1 This aspect of
the new law has been explained as an attempt to avoid the past ex-
periences of a family "railroading" one of its members into a mental
institution. 92 The drafters of the statute concluded that there is less
chance of abuse of process if a family must go to a law enforcement
officer to get a member committed and then testify orally before a mag-
istrate and district court judge as to what "overt acts" were wit-
190. Congressional Hearings 106.
191. Second Senate Hearing 2, 7; Third Senate Hearing 5, 19.
192. First Senate Hearing 7.
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nessed.19 3
The possibility of "railroading" by a family or friend is highly un-
likely due to the procedural due process safeguards that are now in-
corporated in the new laws. The California mental health laws, which
are very similar to North Carolina's in that a law enforcement officer
may initiate the mental commitment procedures, 194 also provide for
any "individual" to petition for judicial commitment. 195 There is, how-
ever, a "pre-petition screening" to determine if there is probable cause
to believe the allegations.19 6 Such a procedure could be instituted un-
der North Carolina's new law by providing, as an alternative to the law
enforcement officer's role in initiating and petitioning, a provision that
allows any person to submit a petition in the form of a sworn affidavit
before a magistrate who could, after examining the petition and the
person, make a probable cause determination of whether the person falls
within the statutory language and should be taken to a physician for an
examination and evaluation. If the magistrate so determines, an or-
der could be issued authorizing a law enforcement officer to take the
person into custody.197
In providing a means by which an individual may petition the
court to begin judicial commitment, a provision should also be in-
cluded in the same section stating that any individual who seeks a peti-
tion knowing that the person for whom the petition is sought is not by
reason of the commission of overt acts violent and of imminent
danger to himself or others or gravely disabled, is guilty of a misdea-
meanor and may be held liable for civil damages. A similar provision
was enacted in California."9 " By placing the provision in the sec-
tion to which it applies, the seriousness of attempting to commit a per-
son in bad faith is emphasized. 99
Another criticism of the new laws is the serious threat to the effi-
193. Letter from North Carolina Representative Howard Tiggs, co-author of the
involuntary commitment law, to Tom Berkau, Jan. 29, 1974, on file with the N.C.
Law Review office.
194. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE §§ 5150, 5170 (West Supp. 1973).
195. Id. § 5201 (West 1973).
196. Id. § 5202, (West Supp. 1973).
197. If such a procedure were adopted, the magistrates preliminary hearing after
the doctor's examination and evaluation should still be provided and with counsel in
order to comply with the Lessard court requirement that a preliminary hearing be held
with counsel and not ex parte and within- 48 hours. 349 F. Supp. at 1091; see text
accompanying notes 141-42 supra.
198. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5203 (West 1973).
199. North Carolina presently provides a civil liability statute but it is located
in another section of Chapter 122. N.C. GEN. -STAT. § 122-51 (1964).
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ciency of law enforcement in some areas stemming from the amount
of travel time expended by the law enforcement officer who must take
a person to and from a treatment facility.200 In some rural counties
of North Carolina, there may be only two or three law enforcement
officers on duty. Where the treatment facility is located at a distance,
an officer can lose the entire day on which a hearing is scheduled and
may leave the county without effective law enforcement. 0 1
In North Carolina the institutions that qualify under the defi-
nition of a treatment facility202 are four regional psychiatric hos-
pitals, three alcoholic rehabilitation centers, five community health
centers203 and the South Wing of North Carolina Memorial Hospital
with the approval of the Director of Inpatient Services.204 In other
words, there are only thirteen treatment facilities which must provide
for the mental health needs of the entire state. As noted previously,
based on the present national rate of hospitalization, one out of every
ten citizens will spend a portion of his life in a mental institution. °3
If North Carolina seriously intends to provide care and treatment for
its mentally ill and inebriates, more treatment facilities must be estab-
lished. To carry forth the new mental laws without completely dis-
rupting the efficiency of law enforcement, more local community health
centers are needed.
California's mental health act provides for the organization and fi-
nancing of community health centers in every county or in counties act-
200. First Senate Hearing 10.
201. E.g., Gates county only has one sheriff and one deputy and is located ap-
proximately 100 miles from the regional treatment facility for the county. On the
day of the hearing, an officer must drive to the facility, pick up the person and bring
him back to the county for the hearing. If the person is committed, another drive
to and from the facility must be made bringing the total drive for the day to approxi-
mately 400 miles. The officer is therefore occupied all day leaving only one county
officer to provide police protection for the county. NoRTm CAROLINA SHMuFFs' As-
socrAnoN, 1973 OFrricAL ANNuAL DmECToRY 188 (51st ed.).
202. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 122-56.2(d) (Supp. 1973) defines a "treatment facility"
as
any hospital or institution operated by the State of North Carolina and des-
ignated for the admission of any person in need of care and- treatment due to
mental illness or mental retardation, any center or facility operated by the
State of North Carolina for the care, treatment or rehabilitation of inebriates,
and any community mental health clinic or center administered by the State
of North Carolina, and, provided that approval of admission or commitment
is obtained from the Director of the Inpatient Service, the Psychiatric Train-
ing and Research Center at the South Wing of the North Carolina Memorial
hospital at Chapel Hill for admission or commitment to that facility.
203. Third Senate Hearing Attachment A at 1.
204. Newsletter from the North Carolina Neuropsychiatric Association, Sept. &
Oct., 1973, at 2-3.
205. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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ing jointly through locally administered and locally controlled com-
munity mental health programs. 0 0 These community health centers
provide a seventy-two hour detention facility where a medical examina-
tion and evaluation may be performed,0 7 a procedure which coin-
cides with the examination and evaluation given at a treatment facil-
ity under North Carolina's new commitment procedures. Having these
local mental health centers would help to insure that the mental health
laws would work efficiently without placing a transportation burden on
the law enforcement officer in rural areas as well as avoiding the trau-
matic effect which may result from carrying a person who is mentally ill
or inebriate over long distances.
B. The Preliminary-Hearing Stage: Magistrates.
The use of a magistrate in the new commitment procedures has
been questioned, and a suggestion has been made to replace him with
the clerk of court.20  However, since the magistrate is available twen-
ty-four hours a day, seven days a week2 9 a hearing under the emer-
gency procedures is available at any time, and if a provision were en-
acted to allow an individual to petition the court, a "probable cause"
hearing could also be held at any time. A better approach might be
to use both the magistrate and the clerk of court in order to provide
a number of sources through which a preliminary hearing may be con-
ducted.
A more serious question involving the magistrate and the pre-
liminary hearing concerns the type of evidence he is allowed to con-
sider in making his determination. As discussed previously, the hear-
say rules should be applicable, and the presence of counsel should be
provided.210
C. The Hearing Stage: District Court
1. Representation of the State and the Attorney's Role. One of the
basic questions raised about the district court hearing has been who
represents the "state" in these proceedings.211 Collateral to this ques-
tion, but possibly determinative, is whether the appointed counsel for
206. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5600, 5602 (West 1973).
207. Id. § 5654 (West 1973).
208. Second Senate Hearing 6, 10.
209. See note 144 supra.
210. See text accompanying notes 150, 172-73 supra.
211. See Third Senate Hearing 8, 10.
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the allegedly mentally ill or inebriate should act as an adversary or
just as a guardian of the person's rights keeping in mind what is in the
best interests of his client.2 12  A common response to the question
of legal advocacy in the commitment area is to treat the matter as a
question of fact best decided by the medical experts and to consider the
consequences of commitment as therapeutic. 21a If this approach is
used and the attorney acts only as a guardian of the person's rights,
then the state will not need representation since all the attorney will
do is make sure the hearing is conducted in proper form, and if the
physicians determine his client is in need of care and treatment, the at-
torney will passively accept this determination as being in the best in-
terests of his client.
Although the statute is silent, the consequences alone of a commit-
ment hearing would seem sufficient to indicate active advocacy as the ap-
propriate role for the defense attorney. This approach would there-
fore create a need for state representation. In Lessard v. Schmidt,214
the court strongly indicated that the attorney's role in a civil commit-
ment was that of an advocate.21 5 The court rejected the state's argu-
ment that counsel was provided in the person of a guardian ad litem
noting that where a guardian is appointed, "'he sees his role not as
an advocate for the prospective patient but as a traditional guardian
whose function is to evaluate for himself what is in the best interests of
his client-ward and then proceed, almost independent of the will of the
client-ward, to accomplish his.' "216 Unless the attorney acts in an
adversary role, persons not properly subject to involuntary commit-
ment may be committed. It is therefore necessary that the state be repre-
sented in order to provide a balanced adversary setting in which to de-
termine whether or not the person alleged to be in need of involuntary
commitment in fact falls within the statutory classification. This ap-
proach has been followed under the California mental health act where
the state is represented by the district attorney for the county unless
his duties are delegated to the county counsel.217
2. Right to Continue the Hearing for Good Cause. At present, the
district court hearing must be held within five days, or for good cause
212. Id.
213. Roth, Dayley, & Lerner, supra note 156, at 401.
214. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
215. Id. at 1098, citing Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A
Need for a Reexamination, 51 M.AQ. L. Rav., 1, 33 (1967).
216. Id.
217. CAL. WELF. & INST'eNS CODE § 5114 (West 1973).
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shown, within ten days after the person is taken into custody.218
Theoretically this five day limit is impossible to meet under the judi-
cial hospitalization procedure since the preliminary hearing is not re-
quired to take place for four days.2 19  Moreover, forty-eight hours
notice of the district court hearing must be given to the person and his
attorney, 220 and this obviously cannot be given until after the magistrate
makes his determination. The section makes the ten day limit abso-
lute,2 2' but an attorney for the alleged mentally ill or inebriate person
should be allowed to ask for a limited continuance for good cause
shown, such as having his own psychiatrist examine the person. 22 2 It
should also be pointed out that the notice requirement is violated
when the judge determines that a person is without counsel "at the
time of the hearing" and then appoints one 22 3 since the attorney has
not been given forty-eight hours prior notice of the hearing. Al-
though notice may be waived by the attorney, he will obviously refuse
to invoke this waiver since he will not have had time for preparation.
In addition, if this is the ninth or tenth day after the person has been
taken into custody, under the present reading of the section the person
will automatically be released if the hearing is postponed to comply
with the forty-eight hour advance notice requirement. This again
points out the need for allowing the attorney to request a limited con-
tinuance past the ten day limit.
3. Mandatory Presence of Person Being Committed at the Hearing.
A number of criticisms have been directed at the requirement that the
alleged mentally ill or inebriate person must be present at the hearing
unless waived in writing by the attorney with the court's concurrence. 224
These criticisms recognize that a long trip from the treatment facility
to the county of the hearing and possibly back again may have a detri-
mental effect on the person's mental and physical health if the person
is seriously in need of care and treatment.2 25  The transportation prob-
lem caused by the mandatory presence has also been a concern of the
218. N.C. GE.N. STAT. § 122-58.6(a) (Supp. 1973).
219. See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra.
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58.6(a) (Supp. 1973).
221. Id. § 58.6(b) (Supp. 1973).
222. At least one court has held that due process of law includes the right to
an independent psychiatric examination for a person being involuntarily committed
and if the person is indigent, the court will appoint an independent psychiatrist to
examine the person. In re Gannon, 123 NJ. Super. 104, 301 A.2d 493 (1973).
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58.6(c) (Supp. 1973).
224. See Second Senate Hearing 10.
225. Id.
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law enforcement officer in rural counties who must drive an excessive
amount taking the person back and forth to the treatment facility.220
However, even if the mandatory language of the statute did not exist,
many attorneys would still refuse to waive their client's right to be pres-
ent.
The problem also arises that, in the situation where the treatment
facility is located some distance from ,the county of the hearing, the at-
torney will not have had an opportunity to talk to his client prior to
the hearing. The attorney will, therefore, want the person brought to
the hearing to consult with him. This situation could be resolved by
the attorney driving to the treatment facility after he receives his forty-
eight hour notice of the hearing, but in cases where the facility is
located at considerable distance, an active attorney will usually not be
able to drop all of his work and make the trip on such short notice. A
few counties have come up with a possible answer to this problem by ap-
pointing counsel at the magistrate's stage and allowing the attorney to
interview the person before he goes to the treatment facility.227 Under
this approach, presence at the hearing may be waived by the attorney
if the best interests of the client would be served, and in most cases the
district court judge would concur in the attorney's judgment. How-
ever, if the attorney acts in an adversary capacity, only in extreme
circumstances would he waive the presence of his client at the hear-
ing.
D. The Appellate Stage: Superior Court and Trial by Jury.
Under the new laws, an appeal is allowed from the district court
hearing to the superior court for a hearing de novo and a trial by
jury if requested.228 As discussed previously, a serious administrative
problem exists in some rural areas of North Carolina where a jury
is only impaneled for superior court every three or four months
-
.
22 0
In attempting to resolve this problem the question has been raised as
to whether a trial by jury is required in an involuntary commitment pro-
ceeding in North Carolina.
Sixteen states presently allow trial by jury in involuntary com-
mitments, 230 and only one state specifically does not.2381 Like most state
226. See First Senate Hearing 3.
227. Second Senate Hearing 10.
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6(g) (Supp. 1973).
229. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
230. MENTALLY DISABLED 53.
231. Omo REv. CODE ANm. § 5122.15 (Baldwin 1964).
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constitutions, North Carolina's constitution provides for the right to
trial by jury in most civil cases in article I section 25. The general
test used to determine in what cases and under what circumstances
jury trial is constitutionally guaranteed is the extent -to which trial by
jury was guaranteed at the time the state's constitution was adopted.2,8 2
Many states have determined that the right to jury trial in insanity
proceedings existed at common law or by statute at the time their
constitution was adopted,288 and therefore the right to jury trial in in-
voluntary commitments was preserved. 284  Groves v. Ware established
that the right to trial by jury in insanity proceedings did not exist in
North Carolina when its constitution was adopted.285 In a later case,
In re Cook,236 which dealt with a previous involuntary commitment
procedure, the court held that commitment to a mental institution
by the clerk of court without a jury trial was permissible.23 7  It may
therefore be concluded that the right to jury trial in civil cases as set
forth in North Carolina's constitution does not compel the right to a
trial by jury in involuntary commitment proceedings. 238
Although the right to trial by jury in criminal cases as guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution has
been held to apply to state court proceedings as part of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, 8 ' the seventh amendment guarantee of
trial by jury in civil cases has not.240
232. E.g., Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921); MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED 54.
233. E.g., In re McLaughlin, 87 NJ. Eq. 138, 102 A. 439 (1917).
234. See In re Coates, 8 App. Div. 444, 188 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1959), affd, 9 N.Y.2d
242, 173 N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 34 (1961).
235. 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921). The court in Groves held:
The right to a trial by jury ... applies only to cases in which the perogative
existed at common law, or was procured by statute at the time the Constitu-
tion was adopted, and not to those where the right and the remedy with it
are thereafter created by statute. . . . This is not a proceeding according
to the course of the common law, in which the right of a trial by jury is
guaranteed, but the proceeding is a statutory one, and the statute, too, enacted
since the adoption of the Constitution. There was not, at the time of such
adoption, the enjoyment of a jury trial in such a case.
Id. at 558, 109 S.E. at 571.
236. 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d 142 (1940).
237. Id. at 385, 11 S.E.2d at 143.
238. In a 1971 opinion by the attorney general of North Carolina, it was inter-
preted under North Carolina's Constitution that due process for a person being invol-
untarily committed under the old commitment laws included the rights to notice, coun-
sel, confrontation of witnesses and advisement of their rights, but not the right to
trial by jury. See 41 N.C. Arr'y GEN. REP. 219 (1971).
239. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
240. Sharpe v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969).
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Finally, in holding that due process must be afforded an individual
who is subject to deprivation of liberty, the Court in In re Gault24' did
not include the right to jury trial in the list of applicable rights it enum-
erated.242 The argument that the fourteenth amendment due process
clause assures the right to a jury trial in the adjudicative phrase of
the state juvenile court delinquent proceeding was rejected in Mc-
Keiver v. Pennsylvania.243  The Court reasoned that "[ilf the jury
trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of
right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the
formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly the
public trial. 244  The same reasoning would also be applicable to the
involuntary commitment procedures.
A trial by jury may very possibly have a detrimental effect on a
person who is mentally ill or inebriate, and since the right is not guaran-
teed by the North Carolina constitution, the exclusion of trial by jury
may be a better approach in conducting commitment proceedings.
Appeal could be allowed directly from the district court hearing to the
court of appeals on the condition that the appeal would not operate as
a stay of the district court order unless so ordered by the court of ap-
peals.2 45 Under this approach, the questionable procedure under the
present statute of requiring two transcripts, one in the district court and
a second in the superior court where the hearing is held de novo, 240
would be resolved by making only one transcript at the district court
hearing. The problem of what to do with the person who is committed,
but appealing, would also be resolved.247
The holding of the district court hearing in an open court room
may possibly have a detrimental effect on a person who is actually
mentally ill or inebriate. The Court in McKeiver allowed a state to ex-
clude the general public while holding a delinquency proceeding,24a
and at least one lower court decision has held that in involuntary com-
mitment hearings, if the conduct of the alleged mentally ill person does
not comport with orderly courtroom procedure, the hearing may be held
241. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
242. It should also be noted that nowhere in the Hayes brief is the right to trial
by jury argued as a part of the desired due process for the mentally ill or inebriate.
243. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
244. Id. at 550.
245. This approach was suggested in the proposed judicial commitment draft sub.
mitted as House Bill 918.
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.6(f), (g) (Supp. 1973).
247. See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
248. See 403 U.S. at 550.
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at another location . 49 A mental commitment proceeding should there-
fore be allowed to be held in the judge's chambers or at the treatment
facility rather than in an open courtroom unless requested otherwise
by the alleged mentally ill or inebriate person.25 0
E. The Rehearing Stage.
There have been a number of questions raised about the rehear-
ing procedures. These questions primarily relate to what testimony
should be considered at the rehearing and where the rehearing should
be held. 251  The section is silent as to what testimony the judge
should consider on rehearing, but presumably it would be that of the
doctors and staff at the treatment facility since they would be the only
ones in contact with the person during the ninety day commitment
period. The section is also silent as to where the rehearing should
take place, but since all the witnesses and the committed person are
at the treatment facility, it would seem logical and more convenient
if a judge in the county where the treatment facility is located would
hold the rehearing.
Another area brought into issue involves the short time period-
252 I a ee
120 days-between rehearings. It has been suggested that the time
limit be extended to one year after the first ninety-day rehearing un-
less a rehearing is requested by the patient, his attorney, or the hos-
pital.253  However, there are certain problems under the new laws with
allowing the attorney or the hospital to request a rehearing.
First of all, the hospital is not going to request a rehearing since
they presently have the authority to discharge a person if they feel he
has sufficiently recovered to leave the facility. In many cases the per-
son may feel he has recovered, but the hospital will not agree. This
leaves the attorney, usually court appointed, to make the request. In
most cases, the appointed attorney is not going to continue his rela-
tionship with his client after he is committed. Therefore there is a good
249. State v. Collman, 9 Ore. App. 476, 491-92, 497 P.2d 1233, 1240-41 (1972).
250. California's mental health act provides that "[h]earings conducted at any
state hospital or any mental health facility designated by any county as a treatment
facility . . . shall be deemed to be hearings held in a place for the trial of civil
actions and in a regular courtroom of the court." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5118
(West 1972). The statute does allow any party to demand the hearing be public
and held in a place suitable for public attendance. Id.
251. See First Senate Hearing 5, 9.
252. Id. at 4.
253. Id.
1974]
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possibility that those, other than the patient, who could request a re-
hearing will not do so.
Unless the attorney or some interested party other than the hos-
pital is required to check periodically with the person to see if he de-
sires a rehearing, the 120-day rehearing of right should continue to be
required. A possible answer to the situation where the person does
not desire a rehearing is to enact a provision in the statutes allowing
the person, through his attorney and with the court's concurrence, to
waive the rehearing. However, a better approach would be to enact a
provision whereby a person could change from involuntary to volun-
tary status.
F. Involuntary Commitment to Voluntary Admission.
The weight of opinion and observation indicate that involuntary
commitment is a procedure that is over-utilized. 4 It has therefore
been suggested that before an order to commit is made, the alterna-
tive of voluntary admission should be carefully considered, and the
person allowed to switch to voluntary admission if he so desires and is
suitable for voluntary admission."'
No provisions have been adopted that would permit switching
from involuntary admission. This is probably due to the new "in-
formal" admission procedures which allow a person to be discharged
upon his written request. However, this new discharge provision
should not affect a procedure which allows a person to change from
involuntary to voluntary status if the full implication of allowing
such a change is understood.
If a person changes his status prior to the district court hearing or
before an order is entered by the district court judge and later desires
to be discharged under the "informal" procedures, the superintendent
or director of the treatment facility, if he feels the person is still in
need of care and treatment, may petition the district court to schedule
the hearing or enter the order for commitment. If the only requirement
is that the order be signed by the district court judge and the person has
been in the treatment facility for a period less than ninety days, this
time should be counted towards his ninety-day rehearing of right; how-
ever, if the person has been in the treatment facility longer than ninety
days, a rehearing should be scheduled. If a person changes his status
254. MENTALLY DISABLED 63.
255. Id. at 62-63.
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after an order for commitment has been signed but prior to the re-
hearing and then requests a discharge, the superintendent or director
may petition the district court to reinstate the original order which
would be effective from the date it was signed. Such procedures
would not offend due process, and the doctrine of "least restrictive al-
ternatives" would be met.
The doctrine of "least restrictive alternatives" was first introduced
in Lake v. Cameron256 in which the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
that the lower courts had a duty to explore alternatives to involuntary
commitment such as nursing homes and private care.257  Under
North Carolina's new commitment laws the district court judge is given
an option to order a person committed to outpatient treatment at
the treatment facility or a private facility;258 however, the alternative
should also be provided for allowing a person to change from invol-
untary to voluntary status if the person so desires and is suitable for
voluntary admission.
V. CONCLUSION
The new mental health legislation has brought to North Carolina
much needed due process safeguards in its involuntary commitment
procedures. Although there are still some areas of the new laws that
raise constitutional questions, 59 many of these issues may be resolved
by judicial interpretation; other areas will still require legislative
changes.26°
Some of the administrative problems that have been experienced
under the new laws will also require legislative attention. The informal
"walk in and walk out" procedure under the voluntary admission pro-
vision needs to be reconsidered to allow -the treatment facility some dis-
256. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
257. Id. at 660.
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6(a) (Supp. 1973).
259. For example, the requirement that a person's violent and dangerous behavior
be caused by mental illness or inebriety, see text accompanying notes 174-75 supra;
the reasonable doubt standard of proof for the state, see text accompanying note 168
supra; the application of the hearsay rules to the preliminary and district court hear-
ings, see text accompanying note 173 supra.
260. For example, the requirement that the preliminary hearing must be held with-
in a reasonable period of time such as 48 hours, see text accompanying notes 141-
42 supra; counsel at the preliminary hearing, see text accompanying note 150 supra;
the requirement of notice to the person of his right against self-incrimination at the
psychiatric interview, see text accompanying notes 158-62 supra; a recording of the
psychiatric interviews for the person's attorney, see text accompanying notes 155-56
supra.
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cretion in admitting or rejecting persons who continually abuse the pro-
cedure. 261 The transportation problems being experienced by the law
enforcement officers262 may be resolved by creating more community
health centers. 2 3  The big, overcrowded, and under-staffed mental in-
stitutions which have provided communities with a place to send their
"undesirable" mentally ill and inebriate citizens are anachronisms.
Other states are approaching their mental health problems by provid-
ing local mental health facilities264 in order that each community may
take the responsibility of care and treatment of its own mentally ill
and inebriate.
In order to evaluate the full implication of North Carolina's new
mental health laws, one must examine both the voluntary admission
and involuntary commitment procedures and policies. The state's
policy of "encourag[ing] the utilization of voluntary admissions to
programs and treatment facilities"265 is reflected in the voluntary ad-
mission procedures that allow a person to seek treatment and care at a
treatment facility as informally as any other person who may be suffer-
ig from a physical disease and seeking treatment and care at a regu-
lar hospital. North Carolina has thus recognized that mental illness
and inebriety are diseases, and a person should be allowed -to a cer-
tain extent to decide for himself whether or not he wants treatment or
care.
Although it may be argued that mental patients do not have the
capacity to choose or reject treatment as do persons with a physical
disease, this assertion is not supported by the majority of mental pa-
tients:
The reason traditionally assigned for forcing treatment on
the mentally ill while making it voluntary for other afflicted per-
sons is that the mentally rn are incapable of making a rational
judgment of whether they need or desire such help. As with ev-
ery similar statement, this depends on what kind of mental illness
is present.. . . It is true that some mentally ill people may be
unable to comprehend a diagnosis and, in these instances, forced
treatment may be more appropriate. But this group is a small
proportion of the total committable population. Most understand
261. See text accompanying notes 89-92, 98 supra.
262. See text accompanying notes 200-01 supra.
263. See text accompanying notes 202-07 supra.
264. E.g., California's Short-Doyle Act, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5600.
767 (West 1973); see text accompanying note 206-07 supra.
265. N.C. GN,. STAT. § 122-56.1 (Supp. 1973).
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what the clinician is saying though they often disagree with his
view. 266
North Carolina's recognition of the right of a person to decide
in most cases whether he wants treatment and care for mental illness is
also indicated by the narrow class of persons who may come within
the involuntary commitment laws. The state's policy that "no person
shall be committed to a treatment facility unless he is determined to
be [violent and of imminent danger] to himself or others or gravely
disabled" 2 ' is carried out by the enactment of detailed procedures that
insure that only this narrow class of persons are subjected to state im-
posed care and treatment.
This progressive view, which likens mental illness and inebriety
to physical diseases and provides in most instances admission proce-
dures analogous to those used in regular hospitals, should aid in even-
tually removing the stigma which has always been associated with men-
tal illness.
THOmAS S. BERYKu
266. Livermore, Malinquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment,
117 U. PA. L. Rav. 75, 88-89 (1968).
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (Supp. 1973). This quote actually uses the
phrase "dangerous to himself or others" rather than "violent and of imminent danger"
which is the test throughout the involuntary commitment sections. It appears that
this change in language may have been an oversight by the drafters since a test based
on dangerousness is much broader than one based on violent and of imminent danger
and therefore does not reflect the drafter's obvious intent of limited application of
the involuntary commitment laws.
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